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HREE times in three years the United States Supreme Court has
tried to decide whether due process requires any limits on a jury's
power to assess the amount of punitive damages. In its first two
decisions, Pacific Mutual Insurance Company v. Haslipl and TXO Pro-
duction Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,2 the Court declared that due
process would not permit "unlimited jury discretion ' 3 or a "grossly exces-
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1. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
2. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
3. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
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sive ' '4 verdict, but each time held that the particular punitive damage
award did not violate due process. Neither decision announced a test that
would identify a punitive damage award that did violate due process. In
1994 the Court has provided a partial answer by focusing on only one
issue. In Honda Motor Company v. Oberg5 the Court held that Oregon
violated due process by refusing to provide judicial review of the amount
of a punitive damage verdict, thereby establishing that there must be
some judicial supervision of the jury's power to assess punitive damages.6
The Court did not, however, establish how much judicial control is
required.
There is a marked contrast between the widely divergent positions of
the Justices in 1993 in TXO, where the lead opinion presented the views
of only three Justices, and the solid 7-2 vote in 1994 in Honda supporting
the majority opinion. The Honda opinion makes clear that the Court's
division in TXO was temporarily set aside rather than resolved. The
Court described Oregon's refusal to provide any judicial review of the
verdict amount as a "departure" or "deviation ' 7 from traditional practice,
making Oregon the sole exception from the practice of review in "[e]very
other State in the Union."' 8 Oregon's stance was easy for the Court to
distinguish from Alabama's procedure in Haslip and West Virginia's pro-
cedure in TXO, because those states did provide judicial review of the
amount of the verdict. At the same time the Court emphasized it was not
providing a test to identify unconstitutionally excessive awards; in fact it
was not even deciding whether due process required any standard for the
judicial review. 9 With so little settled after three major opinions, now is
the time to step back and re-examine the course of the debate.
There is a marked similarity among all three cases in the extensive dis-
cussion of historical practice. Unfortunately, that similarity includes a
consistent failure to ask whether the Court has been reading the historical
record correctly. The Court has always assumed that it should determine
the jury's proper role in assessing punitive damages by examining the de-
tails of historical procedure. From that starting point, the Court has
asked whether due process requires or permits changes from historical
practice. The leading advocate for defining due process by the historical
record is Justice Scalia, who argued in his concurrence in Haslip that
there could be no due process standard for excessiveness, because "tradi-
tional practice" left the amount of punitive damages "to the discretion of
the jury."'10 Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Haslip seconded this defer-
ence to the historical record, with only slightly less confidence." Justice
4. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720.
5. 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
6. Id. at 2341.
7. Id. at 2335.
8. Id. at 2338.
9. Id. at 2335.
10. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24-25.
11. Id. at 40.
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Blackmun's majority opinion in Haslip declared that it would take "a
strong case" to show that historical practice was so inherently unfair as to
deny due process. 12 Justice Stevens's lead opinion in TXO reaffirmed the
hope for history, declaring there were "persuasive reasons" behind the
reliance on historical practice by Justices Scalia and Kennedy. 13 Justice
Stevens's majority opinion in Honda declared a presumption that state
procedure was invalid when it differed from the common law.14
The Court's method of constitutional interpretation in these three due
process cases stands in marked contrast to its own Seventh Amendment
doctrine. The Seventh Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause have different origins and applications and even appear to
raise opposite issues. The Seventh Amendment is violated when a fed-
eral jury has too little power and judicial control is too strong, while the
due process attack asserts that a state jury has too much power and judi-
cial control is too weak. Constitutional doctrine under each amendment,
however, shares common ground, as the application of each must begin
with a standard for defining the proper role of the jury and the proper
extent of judicial control. The due process attack on punitive damage
verdicts may be a new context for asking whether the jury's role can be
correctly defined by the details of historical practice, but similar issues
have been debated for two centuries under the Seventh Amendment.
Seventh Amendment doctrine provides three valuable lessons that pro-
vide a different perspective for evaluating the Court's method of constitu-
tional interpretation in the due process cases. First, the Court itself had
earlier abandoned a similar effort to define the jury's role by the details
of historical practice; it concluded a major debate over fifty years ago by
holding that the Seventh Amendment preserved the substance of civil
jury trial but not the details of historical practice.' 5 In that debate the
Court rejected exactly the same method of constitutional interpretation
the current Justices assume will suffice to define the jury's role for due
process purposes. Second, preserving the substance of civil jury trial but
not the historical detail allows evolution of the jury's role and changes in
the judicial control of a federal jury's power to assess damages. Third, the
strong theme of jury nullification in the ratification debates that preceded
the Seventh Amendment has not prevented this evolution of the jury's
role. That theme is a reminder that judicial control of the jury's power
can affect the outcome of litigation, but jury nullification does not pro-
vide an accurate description of the jury's proper role.
All three Seventh Amendment lessons should be familiar, as they pro-
vide the foundation for current federal practice, but all have been ignored
in the due process cases. That is not wholly surprising, as the first two
lessons have started to fade from memory, while the third is often
12. Id. at 17.
13. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720.
14. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2339.
15. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
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doubted or remembered backwards. Still, they provide an essential re-
minder that the jury's role in American civil procedure has always been
evolving, not static. The conclusion that "the common-law method for
assessing punitive damages does not in itself violate due process"'16 is cor-
rect only because the right to due process has been an integral part of the
evolution of the jury's role. That evolution has been too easily over-
looked in the Court's reading of the historical record in its due process
cases.
This article will discuss what the three lessons from Seventh Amend-
ment doctrine can contribute to the Court's effort to decide whether due
process requires any further judicial control of the jury's power to assess
punitive damages. Part I will review the Seventh Amendment debate in
which the Court rejected comparison with the details of historical prac-
tice as a method of constitutional interpretation. Part II will review the
Seventh Amendment doctrine that permits evolution of judicial control
of the jury's role in assessing damages. Part III will examine the jury
nullification theme that creates the appearance each jury must be able to
play a political role free from judicial control; it will describe how it is
possible to accommodate both judicial control and a political role for the
jury. In conclusion, Part IV will examine how the Court's focus on the
details of historical practice could complicate its development of due pro-
cess doctrine and even undercut Seventh Amendment doctrine long after
this challenge to punitive damage verdicts is over.
I. DEBATING THE METHOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 17
Fifty years ago the Supreme Court decided the last of eight cases', in
which it debated the proper method of interpreting the Seventh Amend-
ment. The Court reaffirmed that the Seventh Amendment preserved the
right to have a jury decide factual disputes, but rejected the argument
that the jury's role should be defined by historical matching of procedural
detail. In recent years both the importance of the debate and the founda-
tion it provides for maintaining the constitutional right have been slowly
forgotten. Most of the cases themselves are not obscure; the opinions in
Slocum, Gasoline Products, Redman, Dimick, and Galloway are still
found in civil procedure casebooks. What has become obscure is what
16. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
18. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v,
Redman, 295 U.S. 474 (1935); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Gasoline Prod. Co. v.
Champlin Ref., 283 U.S. 494 (1931); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); Slocum v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S.
315 (1902); Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593 (1897).
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those cases established about the method of interpreting the Seventh
Amendment. Part of the problem is that the cases discussed a lot of de-
tailed procedural history while determining that historical detail was not
controlling. The heavy dose of history is readily recalled when there is a
new constitutional question about civil jury trial such as the due process
challenge to punitive damage verdicts, while the actual outcome of the
Seventh Amendment debate is easily forgotten.
The debate over the method of interpretation can be hard to follow if
the opinions are read individually because there are two different issues
in each case. The obvious issue in each case is the constitutionality of a
specific procedure-judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), par-
tial new trial, use of a master, additur and remittitur, or directed verdict.
An equally important issue is the method used to interpret the Seventh
Amendment, an issue common to all procedures. In the course of the
debate the Court started with the JNOV and special verdict, then went to
summary judgment, to JNOV, to use of a master, to partial new trials, to
additur and remittitur, back to JNOV, and finally to the directed verdict.
When the cases are read in the order the procedures follow during litiga-
tion, from summary judgment to JNOV, the debate over the method of
constitutional interpretation is less obvious. As a result, it is easy to read
a decision from the middle of the debate as requiring fidelity to historical
practice, even though the Court finally concluded that was not required.
For decades commentators and treatises have given so little attention to
this debate over the method of constitutional interpretation that there is
no current account. Therefore this section must start at the beginning by
describing the debate that established the method of interpreting the Sev-
enth Amendment.
A. THE EARLY HISTORY
A heavy dose of history in many Seventh Amendment cases has cre-
ated an appearance that constitutional interpretation for every jury issue
must begin with increasingly detailed research into long forgotten prac-
tice. In fact, for most issues it is sufficient to treat the birth and early
development of civil jury trial in England as a fortuitous accident. It may
be an essential condition to be sure, for otherwise we might never have
developed this form of citizen participation, but answers about where,
when, or why it developed do not matter. What does matter is that the
English courts developed and the colonists brought over the basic con-
cept of using both professional judges and nonprofessional jurors to re-
solve disputes. That concept was carried out by a body of procedure that
allowed the jury to play a significant role in deciding factual disputes,
while the judge controlled whether the jury would be required to do so. 19
19. See Roger W. Kirst, The Jury's Historic Domain in Complex Cases, 58 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 13-20 (1982).
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As the jury evolved from a group of witnesses to a unit of disinterested
factfinders the judicial control of the jury likewise evolved from the at-
taint to the fine and then to a whole set of procedures. 20 As early as 1655
English judges granted a new trial on the ground the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence. 21 The English judges also developed the prac-
tice that eventually became the directed verdict, at first by guiding the
jury with instructions on the law and comments on the evidence, and then
by directing the proper verdict when the evidence did not create a factual
dispute. The first Congress instructed the federal courts to use the local
procedure of each state.22 That meant the federal courts used the same
common law procedures as state courts to control whether there was any
issue to be tried, whether a jury would decide the case, whether the judge
would direct a verdict, or whether the verdict would be upset by the grant
of a new trial.
The Seventh Amendment drew only slight attention from the Supreme
Court as federal civil procedure developed in the 19th century. The early
cases reflect the Court's hesitance to allow innovations in trial procedure,
but the Court did not have to decide how to interpret the Seventh
Amendment. For example, the Court refused to allow an involuntary
nonsuit because past practice required a plaintiff's consent, but the brief
discussions did not mention the Seventh Amendment.23 Similarly, the
Court refused to permit appellate factfinding to upset a jury's verdict in
Parsons v. Bedford,24 a well-known opinion by Justice Story that inter-
preted a procedural statute and not the Seventh Amendment. The Court
did allow the directed verdict without reaching the constitutional issue,25
and recognized that a trial judge could grant a new trial on grounds
known at common law.2 6
It took more than a century before the Court discussed the method of
Seventh Amendment interpretation, in Walker v. New Mexico & South-
ern Pacific Railroad.27 Even then the Court could have avoided the issue
because the case came from a territorial court not subject to the Seventh
Amendment, but the Court applied the Seventh Amendment because a
statute conferred the same right. The issue before the Court was nar-
row-whether a trial judge could enter judgment in accordance with a
jury's special findings, if the findings were inconsistent with the general
verdict. The plaintiff, who won the general verdict but not all the critical
20. See generally 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 298-350
(7th ed. 1956); FLEMING JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 237-48 (1965); JANE BRADLEY
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 137-262 (1898).
21. Wood and Gunston, Style 466, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (K.B. 1655).
22. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, c. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93.
23. D'Wolf v. Rabaud, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 476, 497 (1828); Elmore v. Grymes, 26 U.S. (1
Pet.) 469 (1828).
24. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
25. Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362 (1850); McLanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1
Pet.) 170, 182 (1828).
26, See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 443, 448-49 (1830).
27. 165 U.S. 593 (1897).
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special findings, argued that the trial judge could only award a new trial.
The Court held that the trial judge could enter a judgment contrary to the
general verdict instead of awarding a new trial, even though the Seventh
Amendment forbids judicial factfinding.
The Court recognized that the specific procedure used in Walker was
an innovation, but explained why the Seventh Amendment did not re-
strict procedure to the details of common law practice:
The Seventh Amendment, indeed, does not attempt to regulate mat-
ters of pleading or practice, or to determine in what way issues shall
be framed by which questions of fact are to be submitted to a jury.
Its aim is not to preserve mere matters of form and procedure but
substance of right. This requires that questions of fact in common
law actions shall be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not
assume directly or indirectly to take from the jury or to itself such
prerogative. 28
The entry of judgment on the basis of the special findings did not infringe
on the "substance of right", because the jury's special findings on the dis-
puted issues were controlling.
At the turn of the century the Court upheld another innovation in Fi-
delity & Deposit Co. v. United States.29 This time the appellant was argu-
ing that an early version of summary judgment procedure was a
deprivation of the right to trial by jury. The procedural rule required that
a defendant in a contract action file an affidavit stating the grounds of
defense. The defendant filed an affidavit that stated no grounds, but in-
stead demanded that plaintiff be required to submit strict proof in a trial
by jury. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for plaintiff on the
ground the affidavit was not sufficient, and held the procedure was consti-
tutional even though defendant did not receive a jury trial. The method
of interpretation continued the trend begun in Walker:
If it were true that the rule deprived the plaintiff in error of the
right of trial by jury, we should pronounce it void without reference
to cases. But it does not do so. It prescribes the means of making an
issue. The issue made as prescribed, the right of trial by jury accrues.
It would seem a logical result of the argument of plaintiff in error
that there was a constitutional right to old forms of procedure, and
yet it seems to be conceded that Congress has power to change them
.... The concession of that power destroys the argument based on
the Constitution .... 30
Fidelity & Deposit kept the Court on the path of requiring that the fed-
eral courts provide a jury trial for factual disputes, while not tying jury
trials to the details of past procedure.
28. Id. at 596.
29. 187 U.S. 315 (1902).
30. Id. at 320.
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B. FRAMING THE INTERPRETATION DEBATE IN SLOCUM
The first debate about the proper way to interpret the Seventh Amend-
ment came in Slocum,3 1 where the Court temporarily set aside its earlier
method of interpretation and substituted historical comparison. The
holding of Slocum has little effect on modern procedure, because it was
circumvented later in Redman,32 but an occasional litigant is reminded of
it when they forget to make a timely motion for a directed verdict or the
renamed judgment as a matter of law.33 The method of historical com-
parison used in Slocum, or its ghost, still haunts us.
Slocum was an action on a life insurance policy. The insurer asserted
the policy had lapsed because the premium was not paid. At trial the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied and the case was
submitted to the jury; it returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The trial
court denied the defense motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict and entered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal the circuit court
held that as a matter of law there was no evidence the policy was valid on
the day of death. Therefore they reversed the judgment for plaintiff and
directed the trial court to enter the JNOV for defendant. In the Supreme
Court the plaintiff argued both that the evidence was sufficient and that,
if not, the required procedure was a new trial and not a JNOV.
The Supreme Court upheld the finding that the evidence of payment
was insufficient to create an issue for the jury. A unanimous Court
agreed that the trial judge had erred in denying the defense motion for a
directed verdict, and agreed that the judgment of the trial court had to be
reversed. 34 The Court split 5-4 on the proper corrective step. The major-
ity held that the appellate court's remand for entry of a JNOV violated
the Seventh Amendment. The majority concluded that there had to be a
new trial, because any other result would allow an appellate court to de-
termine the facts. The majority gave special emphasis to the Seventh
Amendment language forbidding re-examination of a fact tried by a jury
otherwise than "according to the rules of the common law."'35 Therefore
the majority compared the JNOV procedure with each of four common
law procedures, and found the JNOV unconstitutional because it did not
match the common law motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, mo-
tion to arrest judgment, demurrer to the evidence, or motion for a
nonsuit.36
A dissenting opinion by Justice Hughes for the four Justices in the mi-
nority argued that the JNOV was constitutional. 37 He argued that the
historical comparison with the common law procedures raised form and
detail to constitutional right, and that the JNOV did not violate the sub-
31. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1912).
32. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
34. Slocum, 228 U.S. at 385, 400.
35. Id. at 379.
36. Id. at 381-98.
37. Id. at 400.
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stance of the right. He concluded that there was no invasion of the prov-
ince of the jury, because the Court was unanimous that the evidence at
trial did not create a factual dispute. Since there was no factual dispute
the appellate court was not re-examining the facts; thus the JNOV did not
violate the substance of the Seventh Amendment. He suggested there
was no reason to permit a plaintiff to present additional evidence; had the
trial court correctly granted the directed verdict the plaintiff would not
have had a second chance to do better.
The plaintiff in Slocum won only a hollow victory. What could plaintiff
do at the new trial? If plaintiff presented the same evidence, the trial
court would grant the defense motion for a directed verdict. The
Supreme Court made clear that the evidence in the first trial was not
sufficient to go to the jury. The majority opinion suggested that plaintiff
might offer "further evidence rightly conducing to a solution of the is-
sues" 38 at the second trial, but where was plaintiff supposed to find such
evidence? In the first trial plaintiff presented a specific theory of the case
and sworn testimony about the transaction. Having sworn in the first trial
to one set of facts that did not prove the premium had been paid, could
plaintiff avoid a directed verdict by swearing to a completely different
story? In fact, if federal courts in 1913 had modern summary judgment
procedure, it is clear that on remand the trial court would have been re-
quired to grant a defense motion for summary judgment. A party cannot
create a disputed factual issue by changing sworn testimony as necessary
to create a viable claim.39
For litigants, the apparent effect of Slocum was a promise of a second
chance at a new trial if the trial judge erroneously denied a motion for a
directed verdict. The only real effect for the litigants was to postpone the
inevitable, a delay that may be inefficient but not crippling. For proce-
dural reform, the effect of Slocum was far more serious. The majority's
historical comparison of a new procedure against each common law pro-
cedure is a method of constitutional interpretation that could freeze the
development of civil procedure.
C. THE MIDDLE YEARS
After Slocum the Court returned to its earlier method of interpreting
the Seventh Amendment with little mention of Slocum or historical com-
parison. In Ex parte Peterson40 the Court held that a trial judge could
appoint an auditor to examine the accounts between the parties and pre-
pare a report to be introduced at trial. The opinion noted that there was
no common law precedent for the procedure, but relied on Walker to
conclude that changes in old forms of procedure were permitted, as long
as they did not interfere with the jury's task of determining issues of fact.
38. Id. at 380.
39. See, e.g., Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1991).
40. 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
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In Gasoline Products41 the Court held that an appellate court could order
a partial new trial where the trial court's error did not affect all the issues.
There was no common law precedent that allowed a court to set aside
part of a verdict; at common law an error on any issue required a new
trial on every issue. Again the Court declared the Seventh Amendment
did not require old forms of procedure, and allowed a partial new trial if
the issues were clearly separable. If the jury performed its function cor-
rectly for some issues, there did not have to be a complete new trial be-
cause other distinct issues were affected by error. Slocum was
distinguished on its result without mentioning historical comparison.
Historical comparison returned in Dimick,42 another 5-4 decision that
held that additur was unconstitutional. The majority opinion began with
historical comparison, with no mention of Slocum and no discussion of
the proper method of interpreting the Seventh Amendment. The major-
ity concluded that historical practice included no instances of additur so it
could not be constitutional. The suggestion that additur could be upheld
as analogous to remittitur was rejected because there was only weak evi-
dence of historical use of remittitur. In fact, the history of remittitur was
so weak that it too was suspect; the majority gave it grudging acceptance
only because Justice Story had announced it acceptable. 43 A dissenting
opinion in Dimick by Justice Stone argued that the Court had rejected
historical comparison and required only that the jury's function be safe-
guarded. 44 The combination of this unsuccessful argument in the dissent
and the majority's method of interpretation gave the appearance that his-
torical comparison was always required.
The contrast between the two methods of interpretation was clouded
later in the same term when the Court returned to the issue of the consti-
tutionality of the JNOV in Redman45 and approved a procedural path
around Slocum's holding that the JNOV violated the Seventh Amend-
ment. The Court permitted the JNOV, because the trial judge had re-
served ruling on an earlier motion for a directed verdict at the close of
the evidence. The Court held that a decision after the verdict was not an
intrusion on the jury's function, but rather a delayed ruling on a motion
made before the jury was asked to perform its function. The opinion of a
unanimous Court blended both methods of interpretation but did not en-
dorse either. First, the opinion declared that the Seventh Amendment
preserved the substance of jury trial and not mere matters of form or
procedure. 46 Then the opinion reduced the effect of Slocum by a narrow
explanation of its facts.47 Finally the opinion recounted historical prac-
tice, but did not compare each common law procedure with the new
41. Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Champlin Ref., 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
42. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
43. Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578).
44. Dimick, 293 U.S. at 492.
45. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
46. Id. at 657.
47. Id. at 657-58.
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JNOV procedure. Instead the opinion concluded that the other proce-
dures showed that delayed rulings were permissible, even though they
had the effect of negating a jury verdict. 48 As a result, Redman has the
appearance of historical comparison but not the effect.
The Court's opinions had not rejected historical comparison by the
time the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect in 1938, but the new
Rules did not preserve historical forms. They provided for summary
judgment, 49 even though the Court had not held it was constitutional.
They allowed a directed verdict, 50 even though no decision directly up-
held its constitutionality. They incorporated the result of Redman by pro-
viding that a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence
would be deemed reserved if not granted.51 They allowed a new trial for
any reason previously used in law actions, with no specific mention of the
standard for a new trial, the use of a partial new trial,. or the use of remit-
titur or additur.5 2 At the same time the new Rules expressly preserved
the right to trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment.5 3 What re-
mained unsettled was the proper method of interpreting the Seventh
Amendment.
D. SETTLING THE DEBATE IN GALLOWAY
The debate about the method of interpreting the Seventh Amendment
ended fifty years ago in Galloway.54 The narrow issue was whether the
plaintiff had enough evidence to overcome a defense motion for a di-
rected verdict. The two broader issues were whether the directed verdict
was constitutional, and the proper method of interpreting the Seventh
Amendment to decide the issue of constitutionality. The majority opin-
ion by Justice Rutledge resolved the narrow issue by holding that plaintiff
had insufficient evidence, and resolved the broader issues by holding that
the directed verdict was constitutional because it did not violate the sub-
stance of the right to a jury trial. A well known dissent by Justice Black
argued that the plaintiff had sufficient evidence, that the directed verdict
was unconstitutional, and that historical comparison was the only method
faithful to the constitutional guarantee. The eloquence of Justice Black's
dissent and the way the issues are interwoven make it easy to misunder-
stand the procedural issues in Galloway without careful attention to its
facts.
Galloway was an action filed in 1938 to recover under a World War I
soldier's insurance policy that provided benefits if the insured died or suf-
fered "total and permanent disability." The government denied Gallo-
way's claim on the ground the policy lapsed for nonpayment of premium
48. Id. at 659-61.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
54. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
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on May 31, 1919. Galloway alleged he suffered from total and permanent
disability before the policy lapsed. The medical records showed that Gal-
loway suffered from some form of mental disability by 1930, and that to-
tal and permanent disability was present by 1934, but the medical records
did not document his mental condition between 1919 and 1930. Instead,
Galloway offered evidence of incidents that occurred during his service in
France in 1918-1919, witnesses who described his conduct during 1919-
1922, and some weak evidence of his conduct from 1922-1925. His key
witness was a doctor who testified that Galloway suffered from schizo-
phrenia, that the incidents showed that this mental disability began dur-
ing his service in France in 1918, and that it continued up to the trial.
The majority and dissenting opinions disagreed about the sufficiency of
Galloway's evidence, because they used different definitions of the sub-
stantive issue. The majority opinion concluded that plaintiff's evidence
could not be sufficient with an unexplained gap of five or eight years,
because the disability could not be total unless it was continuous. 55
Under the majority definition, someone who was schizophrenic for the
entire eleven years would not be totally disabled if the illness was in re-
mission for part of the time; during that time the insured could have been
regularly employed. Justice Black, in dissent, used a different definition
of disability that could be satisfied by evidence of mental illness. He ar-
gued that the insured did not have to be totally unable to work for the
whole time; under his definition Galloway could qualify if he suffered
from schizophrenia during the whole time, even if the illness had been in
remission and he had been employed for part of that time.56
Justice Black bolstered his argument that the evidence was sufficient
with an argument against the constitutionality of the directed verdict.57
His opinion employed the method of historical comparison the Court had
used in Slocum, and concluded that the directed verdict was not permit-
ted because there was no comparable procedure in 1791. He buttressed
his reliance on historical form with a reminder of the jury's nullification
history, and made clear that he advocated historical comparison in order
to make it easier for a party to get to the jury. At the same time, he did
not fully adopt the implications of his historical comparison and invoca-
tion of jury nullification. His nullification argument would leave no room
for any sort of directed verdict on any set of facts, but even Justice Black
conceded that a verdict could be directed in some cases: "As for myself, I
believe that a verdict should be directed, if at all, only when, without
weighing the credibility of the witnesses, there is in the evidence no room
whatever for honest difference of opinion over the factual issue in
controversy. '58
55. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 386.
56. Id. at 410-11.
57. Id. at 397-407.
58. Id. at 407.
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Justice Black's concession that a directed verdict could be constitu-
tional if there is "no room whatever" for a factual dispute makes clear
why comparison of historical detail cannot preserve a right to a jury trial.
Galloway is a perfect illustration that the power to define the substantive
law controls whether the evidence can create a factual dispute for the jury
to decide. Justice Black did not assert that plaintiff's evidence was suffi-
cient under the majority test for total and permanent disability; he argued
only that there was credible evidence that met his own test. The majority
did not discuss whether the evidence met Justice Black's test; they con-
cluded only that the evidence did not suffice under their test for total and
permanent disability. The Justices simply passed without signaling, as
each opinion evaluated the evidence against its own definition of the sub-
stantive law.
Galloway ended the debate over the method of interpretation by
clearly establishing that the Seventh Amendment preserved the sub-
stance of the right to a jury trial. The majority opinion did not compare
the directed verdict with the details of historical practice. The historical
detail was important only because it established the jury's common law
function as factfinding where there is a disputed factual issue.
The Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact proce-
dural incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law in
1791, any more than it tied them to the common-law system of plead-
ing or the specific rules of evidence then prevailing. Nor were "the
rules of the common law" then prevalent, including those relating to
the procedure by which the judge regulated the jury's role on ques-
tions of fact, crystallized in a fixed and immutable system. On the
contrary, they were constantly changing and developing during the
late 18th and early 19th centuries....
* The more logical conclusion, we think, and the one which both
history and the previous decisions here support, is that the Amend-
ment was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in
only its most fundamental elements . . .59
The method of historical comparison that had been adopted thirty
years earlier in Slocum and followed intermittently during the intervening
years was finally rejected, a point nicely confirmed by the citation of Jus-
tice Hughes's Slocum dissent in the final footnote in Galloway.60 Rejec-
tion of fidelity to historical detail did not mean disappearance of the idea,
because even the Court's clear holding could not eliminate the persistent
hope that history can simplify Seventh Amendment interpretation or de-
fine a different role for the jury.
E. THE FADING MEMORY OF GALLOWAY
After Galloway, the Supreme Court did not have to give as much atten-
tion to defining the constitutional requirements for the jury's role. At the
59. Id. at 390-92.
60. Id. at 395 n.33.
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
same time, the 1938 merger of law and equity under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure raised a new set of issues that required a different use of
the historical record. In more recent cases a common Seventh Amend-
ment issue has been whether a party can demand a jury trial on a claim
that did not exist in 1791.61 The Court has held that the constitutional
right extends to all actions seeking legal remedies to enforce legal rights
in the ordinary courts.62 Determining whether an action is legal requires
examination of the jurisdictional rules and substantive reach of the vari-
ous courts in 1791 to find which provides the closest analogue for the
modern claim. Most often the comparison is between courts of law and
courts of equity, so the law-equity distinction has become a staple ingre-
dient of Seventh Amendment interpretation. Application of this test can
require historical research into unfamiliar procedure and forgotten dis-
tinctions, but the law-equity test can only establish that a party has a right
to jury trial on a legal claim if the evidence and substantive law create a
factual dispute.
The historical research required for the Seventh Amendment law-eq-
uity test has made it easy to expect that similar research will answer all
constitutional questions about the civil jury. The Court already started in
that direction even before it considered the due process attack on puni-
tive damages. In Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.63 the
Court rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to a punitive damage
verdict with a concluding note that suggested the Seventh Amendment
made the Court reluctant to make any change in the jury's role in assess-
ing punitive damages that would "stray too far from traditional common-
law standards. ' 64 With historical research prominent in other due pro-
cess cases as well, such as Justice Scalia's plurality opinion permitting
transient personal jurisdiction,65 it was easy for the Court to hope that
history would simplify the debate about the jury's role in assessing puni-
tive damages. A similar hope in Slocum took the Court thirty years to
correct.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF VERDICT AMOUNTS
Even if historical detail provides inaccurate guidance, the Court still
must decide whether there should be any due process standard for exces-
siveness. The last time the Court addressed the issue in TXO, the Justices
divided into three equal blocs. Justice Scalia, the leader of one bloc of
three Justices, argued that there is no due process standard of excessive-
ness. In Haslip Justice Scalia declared that the traditional practice of
leaving assessment of punitive damages to the jury's discretion necessar-
61. E.g., Wooddell v. International Bhd. Elec. Workers, 502 U.S. 93 (1991); Teamsters
v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Tu v.
United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
62. Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
63. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
64. Id. at 280 n.26.
65. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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ily constitutes due process.66 He was joined in Haslip by Justice Ken-
nedy, who concurred on the ground that the history of jury determination
of punitive damages meant the Court needed "no further evidence of its
essential fairness."' 67 This bloc gained a third vote in TXO, when Justice
Thomas joined Justice Scalia's concurrence reaffirming his historical ar-
gument from Haslip.68 In Honda Justice Scalia made clear he has not
abandoned his position; he joined the majority but also concurred sepa-
rately to note his view that the judicial review would enforce "state-pre-
scribed limits" on punitive damages.69
Justice O'Connor gave a different reading to the historical record in her
dissent in TXO, concluding that historical practice permitted judicial in-
tervention to set aside excessive verdicts.70 Justice White joined this dis-
sent, as did Justice Souter in substantial part, making Justices O'Connor
and Scalia's positions equally supported. Between them, a center bloc
suggested that the Court could define due process limits if the states took
no action to limit "punitive damages that 'run wild"' 71 because verdicts
were "grossly excessive,"72 but both times voted to affirm the particular
judgment. In Haslip the center was a majority, but in TXO it slipped to
three votes as only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun joined
the lead opinion by Justice Stevens. Still, the center bloc was controlling
because the three blocs could form two different majorities. The center
bloc and Justice O'Connor's bloc agreed that the Court could impose due
process standards if the states did not, disagreeing only on whether the
states should be allowed more time. The center bloc and Justice Scalia's
bloc agreed not to impose due process standards in each case, disagreeing
on what the Court would do if the states continued to allow excessive
verdicts to stand.
Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Honda continued to seek a com-
promise by holding that the states cannot leave the assessment of punitive
damages to the "unreviewable discretion of a jury" 73 but not defining
how much judicial control is required. Instead, his opinion described ju-
dicial review of verdict amounts, declared such review well-established at
common law, and portrayed Oregon as holding a "unique position" by
straying from the American consensus on the proper role of the jury and
the proper extent of judicial review. 74 In the absence of a holding that
due process requires the same extent of judicial review, however, it is
possible some states will provide a more limited scope of judicial control
than Justice Stevens described. In fact, even as he wrote, part of his de-
66. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24-25.
67. Id. at 40.
68. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2726 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.).
69. 114 S. Ct. at 2342-43.
70. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2729-31.
71. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
72. 113 S. Ct. at 2720.
73. 114 S. Ct. at 2342.
74. Id. at 2338.
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scription of the proper extent of judicial review was being challenged by
one state in a case that the Court would later see in 1993.
Justice Stevens did not differentiate between a verdict that is too high
because of the jury's error and a verdict that is too high even though the
jury performed its task correctly. His opinion merged both grounds:
In the 19th century, both before and after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, many American courts reviewed damages
for "partiality" or "passion and prejudice." Nevertheless, because of
the difficulty of probing juror reasoning, passion and prejudice re-
view was, in fact, review of the amount of awards. Judges would
infer passion, prejudice, or partiality from the size of the award....
Modern practice is consistent with these earlier authorities. In the
federal courts and in every state, except Oregon, judges review the
size of damage awards. .... 75
A recent case from Kentucky illustrates how differently the states can
read the same historical record. In Hanson v. American National Bank &
Trust Co. the jury awarded a former customer punitive damages of
$5,775,000 against the bank. On appeal the Kentucky Court of Appeals
reviewed the verdict for excessiveness in order to insure that the amount
"have some reasonable relation to the injury and its cause, and not be
disproportionate when compared to them."'76 After that review it or-
dered a remittitur of $2 1/2 million. On further review the Kentucky
Supreme Court refused to conduct its own review of the amount of the
verdict and vacated the remittitur ordered by the intermediate court. 77
The United States Supreme Court vacated the state decision and re-
manded the case to the Kentucky Supreme Court for reconsideration in
light of TXO.78 On remand the Kentucky Supreme Court declared "obe-
dience" to the Supreme Court's remand, but did not retreat from its ear-
lier holding that it would not review the amount of the punitive damage
verdict.79
The state court concluded that Kentucky trial and appellate judges
should not permit a punitive damage verdict to stand unless it was sup-
ported by competent evidence, based on proper instructions, and free of
passion and prejudice. 80 Those specific errors exhausted the grounds for
judicial review of the verdict amount; the state court rejected the possibil-
ity of any other review of the amount assessed by the jury:
It is with equal caution that this Court does not substitute its opinion
as to the amount of exemplary damages for that of the jury. It was
the trial jury and trial judge who heard all the evidence and had the
75. Id. at 2338.
76. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hanson Constr. Co., No. 89-CA-639-MR, slip
opinion at 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (opinion withdrawn by Kentucky Supreme Court, 1991
Ky. App. LEXIS 35).
77. Hanson v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 844 S.W.2d 408 (Ky. 1992).
78. 113 S. Ct. 3029 (1993).
79. Hanson, 865 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Ky. 1993).
80. Id. at 310.
[Vol. 48
PUNITIVE DAMAGE VERDICTS
opportunity to see and hear the witnesses during the lengthy trial.
The sanctity of the jury verdict is at the heart of our judicial system.81
The reference to the better ability of the trial judge to evaluate the
verdict could reconcile Kentucky law with the requirements of Honda,
because judicial review does not have to mean appellate review. How-
ever, the tenor of the opinion, the failure to articulate any standard of
excessiveness for the trial court's review, and the reference to the "sanc-
tity" of the verdict strongly suggests that Kentucky is not committed to
Honda's description of the jury's role and scope of judicial review. In-
stead, the Kentucky approach accords more closely with Justice Scalia's
position in Haslip that it has been the "traditional practice of American
courts to leave punitive damages (where the evidence satisfies the legal
requirements for imposing them) to the discretion of the jury."' S2 The
essential question is whether comparative review of jury verdicts is an
infringement on the jury's power that undercuts the right to jury trial.
Kentucky's position presents a major challenge to Honda's description
of the proper extent of judicial control of the jury's power, but that is only
because Justice Stevens tried too hard to present a uniform picture of
judicial review. Seventh Amendment doctrine provides a different per-
spective, because judicial control of verdict amounts in federal court has
always been evolving. That does not mean that due process doctrine
must be identical, but it does provide a valuable baseline for analyzing
why comparative review of verdict amounts is consistent with preserva-
tion of the right to jury trial. Once again, it will be necessary to review
Seventh Amendment doctrine that is only dimly remembered, even
though it is at the heart of current federal practice.
A. THE HISTORY OF REMITTITUR PRACTICE
Judicial review of the jury's verdict on a motion for new trial has never
been considered a violation of the right to trial by jury. Common law
judges exercised the power to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial
because of excessive damages before either the Seventh or Fourteenth
Amendments were adopted, so the practice would be permitted under
the most rigid historical benchmark.8 3 Even Justice Scalia has not dis-
puted the legitimacy of judicial review of a verdict, but he has made the
related argument that the extent of review by modern judges is limited to
the grounds that were used when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted. In Haslip he argued that 19th century judges did no more than
set aside verdicts based on passion or prejudice, concluding therefore that
no other judicial review should be required. 4 The method of his argu-
ment makes the same subtle mistake the Court made long ago in Slocum,
assuming that the role of the jury can be defined statically by examining
81. Id. at 311.
82. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24-25.
83. JAMES, supra note 20, at 314-15.
84. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 27.
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the procedure at a particular time. His method rejects the Court's resolu-
tion in Galloway, that the procedures for jury trial have been constantly
evolving to maintain the role of the jury.
Seventh Amendment doctrine does not limit the extent of judicial re-
view of verdict amounts by historical practice. That principle was estab-
lished in the first and most prominent landmark in the caselaw on the
extent of this power, which happens not to be a Supreme Court opinion.
That honor belongs to Justice Story's opinion as a Circuit Justice in Blunt
v. Little,85 the case that brought the remittitur to federal practice. Justice
Story's standing as an authority on the Seventh Amendment is so strong
that his opinion became an important part of Seventh Amendment doc-
trine even though it did not interpret the Amendment. It is particularly
relevant here because he addressed an issue remarkably similar to issues
in the dispute over punitive damages. In examining Justice Story's opin-
ion it is important to recognize that the primary goal is not to learn what
the practice was in 1822, but rather to determine whether the method of
interpretation limited the power of federal judges by historical practice.
Blunt involved an action for malicious prosecution where the jury in-
structions did not provide any objective measure for assessing damages.
The jury returned a verdict of $2,000, an amount the defendant argued
was so excessive that there should be a new trial. Justice Story accepted
the jury's decision on liability, but he concluded that $2,000 was an exces-
sive verdict because the damages should have been more moderate.86
Justice Story's opinion makes clear that judicial power to control the
jury's assessment of damages was unquestioned.
As to the question of excessive damages, I agree, that the court may
grant a new trial for excessive damages. So far as the contrary doc-
trine may be supposed to be maintained by Duberley v. Gunning, 4
Term R. 651, it has been qualified or overturned in Chambers v.
Caulfield, 6 East, 244, and Hewlett v. Cruchley, 5 Taunt. 277. It is
indeed an exercise of discretion full of delicacy and difficulty. 87
The brief report of this opinion does not explain how a judge could
determine a verdict was excessive when the substantive law did not pro-
vide a standard for the jury's verdict. That explanation must be derived
from the three English cases cited by Justice Story, a task that also dem-
onstrates how the role of the jury in assessing damages evolved as the
courts faced new issues.
Duberley v. Gunning8 8 was a 1792 case in which King's Bench declined
to set aside a verdict of 5000 pounds on a claim for criminal conversation,
even though the Chief Judge thought the damages were "a great deal too
much." 89 Justice Story did not describe Duberley as a case that negated
the court's power to set aside an excessive verdict; his words suggest only
85. 3 F. Cas. 760 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578).
86. Id. at 762.
87. Id. at 761.
88. 100 Eng. Rep. 1226 (K.B. 1792).
89. Id. at 1228.
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that it may have created some question. The report of the case shows
that Duberley was a 3-1 decision in which every opinion made clear that
none of the judges questioned the earlier precedent that had established
the power of the court to set aside an excessive verdict. The majority
refused to set aside the verdict on a narrower ground, because they be-
lieved the substantive law provided no standard or rule for judging
whether the verdict was excessive in the particular case. The nature of
the case and the jury's role in assessing damages was most clearly ex-
pressed by Judge Ashhurst in explaining why he would not grant a new
trial.
Where damages depend in any wise, upon calculation, the Court
have some medium to direct them, by which they are enabled to cor-
rect any mistake of the jury. But where there is no such light to
guide them, where the damages depend upon mere sentiment and
opinion, the Court have no line to go by; and therefore it would be
very dangerous for us to interfere.90
The second case cited in Blunt, Chambers v. Caulfield,91 shows that the
hesitation of 1792 had been overcome by the same court by 1805. This
was another case for criminal conversation, with a verdict for 2000
pounds. The court declared it did have the power to order a new trial if
the excessive damages were due to "undue motives, or some gross error
or misconception" 92 by the jury, but it refused to set aside the verdict
because the evidence showed the verdict was not excessive. The same
result, and the same assertion of power to set aside an excessive verdict,
was made in the third case cited in Blunt, Hewlett v. Cruchley.93 In that
case Chief Judge Mansfield declared: "[I]t is now well acknowledged in
all the courts of Westminster-hall, that whether in actions for criminal
conversation, malicious prosecutions, words, or any other matter, if the
damages are clearly too large, the Courts will send the inquiry to another
jury."'94
The discussion in the three English cases has a modern ring because
punitive damages also are not determined by "calculation" but rather by
the jury's discretion or "sentiment and opinion." The common law judges
recognized the evolution of the power to reject an excessive verdict, but
they hesitated to exercise the control when they had no basis for compari-
son. They continued the evolution only after they decided that they had
to assert some control over verdicts, by at least establishing an upper
limit. The common law judges left the jury with more discretion in cases
where there was no objective measure in the substantive law, but even in
those areas the judges would intervene after the verdict if the jury's as-
sessment was too far out of line. With this precedent Justice Story con-
cluded that he likewise had the power to grant a new trial on the ground
90. Id.
91. 102 Eng. Rep. 1280 (K.B. 1805).
92. Id. at 1285.
93. 128 Eng. Rep. 696 (C.P. 1806).
94. Id. at 698.
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of excessive damages for malicious prosecution, even while he acknowl-
edged that the absence of any standard made the task delicate and diffi-
cult. After Justice Story decided the verdict was excessive he gave the
plaintiff an option to remit the excess to avoid a new trial. When the
plaintiff accepted the option and remitted the $500 excess, Justice Story
entered judgment for the plaintiff for $1,500 instead of the $2,000 amount
found by the jury.
From this start remittitur evolved as a procedure that gave the trial
judge limited power to review verdict amounts in cases where the mea-
sure of damages was not precisely defined. 95 After Blunt the use of re-
mittitur was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1886,96 and upheld in
the face of a Seventh Amendment challenge in 1889.97 If a defendant
moved for new trial on the ground the verdict was excessive, the trial
judge could try to avoid the need for a second trial. If the verdict was
excessive but otherwise proper, the judge could conditionally deny the
new trial motion and give the plaintiff an option. If the plaintiff remitted
the excessive portion of the verdict, the court would enter judgment for
the reduced amount and there would be no need for a new trial. If the
plaintiff refused to remit the excessive portion, the judge would grant the
motion for new trial. The judge's power is limited because a plaintiff can
reject the judge's calculation of the excessive portion and obtain a new
verdict from a second jury, but the judge's power is real because the ex-
pense and risk of a second trial pushes many plaintiffs to agree to the
remittitur.
B. REMITrITUR AND COMPARATIVE REVIEW
Remittitur procedure has been under a cloud of suspicion since the
Court decided Dimick. That appearance may have been inevitable in
1935 when the Court had not yet resolved its debate over the method of
interpreting the Seventh Amendment. The majority still expected that all
procedure would match historical detail, so it gave an unsympathetic
reading to Justice Story's conclusion. After Galloway established that
federal practice was not bound by the details of historical practice the
Court could have provided a better explanation for the constitutionality
of remittitur, but it never again addressed the issue. As a result of this
accident of timing, modern commentators describe the constitutionality
of remittitur as a "settled question" 98 that can not be reversed without a
major "judicial uprooting," 99 while at the same time they suggest it rests
on a "shaky foundation"'1 that "has been criticized ... with some justifi-
95. JAMES, supra note 20, at 315-17.
96. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 (1886).
97. Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889).
98. 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE 103 (1973).
99. 6A JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 59.08[7] at 59-189(1993).
100. 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 98, at 102.
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cation." 101 Justice Story deserves better than this lukewarm endorsement
that destroys the importance of remittitur practice with the implicit
message that cautious adherence to historical landmarks is the only safe
course.
The most important part of Justice Story's opinion was his conclusion
that judicial review of the jury's assessment of damages was not limited to
either the specific actions or particular grounds where review had been
previously used. His opinion anticipated the debate over the method of
constitutional interpretation by almost a century and his conclusion is di-
rectly confirmed by the result in Galloway. Interpreting the Seventh
Amendment requires more than searching the historical record to dis-
cover what judges used to do about excessive verdicts in a particular kind
of case. Such a search provides no more than a static measure of the
jury's role at one time. That may help understand current options but it
cannot be dispositive because the jury's role is always evolving. There
was no debate that could establish that the sponsors of the Fourteenth
Amendment even thought about the jury's role in 1868, so there is noth-
ing that could establish what they intended as the measure of the jury's
role in the definition of due process. However, given the common history
of jury trial in state and federal court and some shared consensus about
the value and role of the civil jury, Seventh Amendment doctrine can at
least provide a foundation for considering whether judicial review of the
amount of a verdict should be part of due process.
Remittitur practice preserves the substance of jury trial by allowing ju-
ries to play a greater role in assessing general damages than they would if
judges had no way to control excessive verdicts. This apparently counter-
intuitive conclusion depends on recognition that the jury has no power to
define the measure of damages if they have already been defined by
judges or statutes as part of the substantive law. This key lesson is often
forgotten because the jury's power in many cases is defined so narrowly
that the jury may have no role at all. For example, in a contract action
under the Uniform Commercial Code a seller may be entitled to the con-
tract price,102 or the buyer may be entitled to the difference between the
contract price and the cost of cover.103 If liability is not disputed and
there is no factual dispute about the relevant numbers, summary judg-
ment is proper because there is no factual dispute for the jury to resolve.
The case would not go to the jury on the chance they might craft their
own measure of damages to reward an innocent victim of a breach with a
bonus or punish an unrepentant contract breaker with a penalty. If a jury
did return a verdict outside the amount dictated by the substantive law it
would clearly be set aside. 10 4
101. MOORE, supra note 99, at 59-188.
102. U.C.C. § 2-709 (1990).
103. U.C.C. § 2-712 (1990).
104. JAMES, supra note 20, at 315.
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The idea that the jury should have unlimited discretion to assess dam-
ages has derived its current strength from a persistent failure to recognize
how much the jury's power over many other issues is controlled by the
substantive law. The Supreme Court has never had to consider whether a
party would be denied due process if there were no substantive law and a
jury decided a contract case without instructions or a tort case with no
standard of liability or measure of compensatory damages. That issue
does not arise because the jury's role has changed over the centuries as
the substantive law has evolved through legislation and judicial decisions.
For most of that time punitive damage verdicts were relatively uncom-
mon so they got little sustained attention. A key issue dividing the Court
in Haslip and TXO is whether state substantive law on punitive damages
is evolving at an acceptable pace now that they are more common and
larger. In the short time between Haslip and TXO many state courts
interpreted or adopted state law on punitive damages in response to the
majority's discussion in Haslip,10 5 but the Kentucky opinion shows that
some state courts dispute the need to control the jury's discretion.
Defining the jury's role according to historical practice will skew the
result in the punitive damage debate by obscuring certain steps in the
argument. The observation that punitive damages were not reviewed in
the 19th century may appear to compel two conclusions: that they would
not have been reviewed at that time even if substantially larger or more
frequent, and that they can not be reviewed in the 20th century even if
conditions have substantially changed. Justice Story's method of inter-
pretation in Blunt provides a contrast; neither conclusion is inevitable and
neither is part of Seventh Amendment doctrine. Even if judges could use
remittitur practice to review punitive damage verdicts, however, that does
not mean that each state should do so, or that the Court should force
every state to do so.
Justice Kennedy has argued that the states should not be forced to re-
view punitive damage verdicts for a reason that goes beyond his endorse-
ment of Justice Scalia's reliance on historical practice. In TXO he argued
that there would be no standard to measure when a verdict is grossly
excessive:
A reviewing court employing this formulation comes close to relying
upon nothing more than its own subjective reaction to a particular
punitive damages award in deciding whether the award violates the
Constitution. This type of review, far from imposing meaningful,
law-like restraints on jury excess, could become as fickle as the pro-
cess it is designed to superintend. Furthermore, it might give the
illusion of judicial certainty where none in fact exists, and, in so do-
ing, discourage legislative intervention that might prevent unjust pu-
105. See, e.g., MGW, Inc. v. Fredricks Dev. Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2888 (4th Dist. 1992);
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 604 A.2d 445, 473 (Md. App. 1992); Herman v. Sun-
shine Chem. Specialties, Inc., 608 A.2d 978, 983-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Gam-
ble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350 (S.C. 1991); Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d
897 (W. Va. 1991).
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nitive awards. 10 6
Justice Kennedy's position in TXO follows directly from his observa-
tion in Haslip that "inconsistency of jury results can be expected"'10 7 be-
cause a jury is not a permanent body and jury instructions can be abstract
and general. In TXO he argued that the Court should not be concerned
about the "quirks of juries" as long as verdicts were not the result of bias,
passion, or prejudice.
The argument of Justice Kennedy provides an alternative explanation
for the position of the Kentucky Supreme Court that does not depend on
a static interpretation of the historical record. His argument assumes that
other procedural controls are available to determine if the jury heard suf-
ficient evidence, if it was properly instructed, or if the jurors were influ-
enced by bias, prejudice, or passion. He thereby concludes that nothing is
left except the jury's exercise of discretion, so judicial review of the ver-
dict for excessiveness must infringe on the role of the jury. The logic does
not support the conclusion, because judge and jury are not looking at
exactly the same body of information and not answering exactly the same
question. The differences are an essential part of jury trial that has been
almost completely overlooked in recent years because there has been lit-
tle examination of the role of the jury.
Remittitur has evolved as a procedural method of handling a problem
inherent to any system that uses nonprofessionals in the role of a
factfinder. Each jury is supposed to decide only the specific case, so the
jury is not told how similar cases have been decided. The jury's lack of
exposure to the facts or verdicts in other cases is very important because
it promotes careful attention to the specific evidence in the case on trial.
It is also the source of a serious problem because it isolates the jury from
comparative information. Generally the elements of damage are more
precisely defined when there is an available measure, so the jury is given
the greatest discretion in assessing the damages that are hardest to mea-
sure. That has long been true for damages for pain, and is now even more
true for punitive damages.
In the calculation of compensatory damages it seems unlikely that each
and every jury will assess injury, pain, disability, or the value of money on
exactly the same scale, even if each juror and every jury deliberates cor-
rectly. Extreme variations can be made less likely by group deliberations,
but there is still a risk that some verdicts will deviate markedly from the
range in comparable cases. The deviation may be caused by the jury's
different conclusion about the amount of pain or the extent of disability.
The deviation may be caused solely by the jurors' subjective valuation of
adequate compensation for certain pain or disability. A verdict may ap-
pear surprising only because the jurors have a different value for money.
Jurors cannot know if their verdict is the product of strongly atypical
views without the comparative information that would allow them to cor-
106. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2725.
107. 111 S. Ct. 1055.
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rect for the deviation. Giving the jurors comparative information, how-
ever, would distract them from their focus on the unique features of the
particular case. Remittitur has served as a valuable procedure to achieve
both goals in awarding damages. The jury's discretion is not distracted by
concerns about comparability, but the judges can exercise sufficient con-
trol by reviewing the verdict after it is returned.
The Supreme Court recognized that a verdict could be both excessive
but otherwise proper in the first case in which it considered a constitu-
tional challenge to remittitur practice. In Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle
Co. v. Mann10 8 the trial court found that less than half of a $40,000 ver-
dict for converting cattle was proper; it conditioned the denial of defend-
ant's motion for a new trial on remission of $23,000. On appeal the
defendant argued that the amount remitted was so large that it showed
the jury was governed by passion or that it had deliberately disregarded
the evidence. The Court agreed that a verdict could not be saved by re-
mittitur if the excessive amount was the product of prejudice or a reckless
disregard of the instructions. The Court still affirmed the trial judge's
remittitur, however, because there was no other evidence of any defects
in the verdict.
For almost two centuries federal judges have been correcting the jury's
lack of comparative information on compensatory damages in similar
cases through remittitur for verdicts that are too high, or by granting a
new trial for verdicts that are either too high or too low. Both are fairly
crude tools because the judge must work with only the jury verdict. How-
ever, both provide a check on a verdict that is very far out of line. Judges
do not have to set exact limits on the amount of allowable damages in
every case; it is most often sufficient to find that the verdict falls within an
approximate range. Similarly, judges do not decide which party has the
most persuasive evidence on liability in every jury trial; it is sufficient in
most cases to find that there is a factual dispute for the jury to decide. In
closer cases the judge's decision about whether to grant a directed verdict
or submit the case to the jury requires evaluation of the actual evidence
against a standard. That standard depends on more than the evidence
heard by the jury; the standard also depends on the purposes of the sub-
stantive law, the need for certainty in the primary activity governed by
the substantive law, and how well juries in general can understand the
substantive law and the evidence.
Similarly, in making the decision about whether a verdict is comparable
to other verdicts the trial judge must consider all the evidence in the case
about the extent of the damage, and then compare that evidence against a
standard. 10 9 The standard is the judge's evaluation of what an average or
typical jury would award as damages in the case. The standard will be a
range of possible verdicts and not a precise number; a range is all that can
be set when the variables can not be precisely measured and each jury is a
108. 130 U.S. 69 (1889).
109. Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1257 (9th Cir. 1993).
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unique group of nonprofessional citizens exercising their best judgment
about an unfamiliar question. For damages as well as for liability, the
judge must consider both the evidence that the jury heard during the trial
and information about other jury verdicts that the jury never heard. The
effect can be just as dramatic with a verdict for compensatory damages as
it has been in some of the punitive damage cases, as in the recent decision
of a federal trial judge that a defense motion for a new trial would be
granted if plaintiffs did not remit $106 million of the $107 million the jury
had awarded for pain." 0
The current debate has shown that comparability of punitive damage
verdicts is far more complex than comparability of compensatory damage
verdicts. The Court has lamented that intrajurisdictional and interjuris-
dictional comparisons will not be a straightforward task."' Many of the
factors the trial judge and appellate courts could use to review punitive
damage present novel issues. Mitigating factors, such as other penalties
or inability to pay damages, are not considered by judge or jury in assess-
ing compensatory damages. Broader issues, such as the deterrent effect
on the defendant or others, have no place in compensatory damages.
This article will not examine whether punitive damage verdicts are too
rare or too frequent, nor whether they are too large or too small. Per-
haps they are just right, or not so far wrong that the Court must overcome
its reluctance to interfere in state civil procedure. These issues can be
addressed by the Court once it is free from the assumption that judicial
review is an intrusion on the role of the jury and examines how the states
could employ the creativity Justice Story made possible long ago.
III. TAMING THE JURY NULLIFICATION HISTORY
Jury nullification is a familiar theme in many disputes about civil jury
trial. The central idea is that the jury should decide what the law should
be, so judicial control may not reduce or defeat the jury's power to ignore
or nullify the substantive law. Variations on the theme form a natural
part of the arguments for matching historical detail when interpreting
constitutional provisions affecting the jury. Opponents of procedural
change or judicial control can argue that the Constitution does not permit
or require any deviation from past practice. This method of constitu-
tional interpretation is sometimes reinforced by a reminder that the jury's
power to nullify the substantive law was an important theme in the ratifi-
cation debates. Justice Black's dissent in Galloway is a prominent exam-
ple of this use of the nullification history to support an argument about
the jury's role."i2 While Galloway confirmed that the jury nullification
theme had no place in federal civil procedure, there is no line of cases in
which the Supreme Court explicitly debated and buried it. Consequently,
110. Datskow v. Teledyne Continental Motors Aircraft Prod., 826 F. Supp. 677
(W.D.N.Y. 1993).
111. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720.
112. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 397-407.
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the theme continues to appear in the Court's opinions; for example, in
Justice Rehnquist's argument in Parklane that historical practice should
limit the effect of preclusion rules on the right to jury trial,113 and more
subtly in the suggestion of Justices Scalia and Stevens that the "Founding
Fathers" wanted the jury to determine the amount of a civil penalty be-
cause the government should "take the bitter with the sweet."'1 14
The jury nullification theme has not been addressed by name in any of
the Court's three due process cases, but it has not been completely absent
either. An amicus brief in TXO for the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America (ATLA) sketched part of its argument under a heading declar-
ing "Substantive Limits Conflict with the Seventh Amendment Right to
Trial by Jury." 1 5 ATLA reminded the Court that "there is at least some
historical indication that part of the 'specific intent' of the Anti-federalist
proponents of the provision was to preserve the type of broad jury discre-
tion approved in the original punitive damage cases. .... ,1*"6 In Honda
the amicus brief for ATLA repeated the same argument, with citations to
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Parklane, and concluded that the "history
of the jury in America... is a chronicle of resistance to judicial control of
jury verdicts." 117 In her dissent in Honda Justice Ginsburg objected that
"the Court barely acknowledges the large authority exercised by Ameri-
can juries in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the early years of our nation,
juries 'usually possessed the power to determine both law and fact.""'118
Her opinion cited some of the same materials as the ATLA brief in sup-
port of her reading of the historical record of judicial control.119
The majority took note of the jury nullification theme in Honda, but
only by a cryptic and tentative response in the last footnote of the major-
ity opinion that was primarily a plea in confession and avoidance:
Judicial deference to jury verdicts may have been stronger in 18th
century America than in England, and judges' power to order new
trials for excessive damages more contested .... Nevertheless, be-
cause this case concerns the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 19th century American practice is the "crucial time for
present purposes." . . . [B]y the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified in 1868, the power of judges to order new trials for ex-
cessive damages was well established in American courts. In addi-
tion, the idea that jurors can find law as well as fact is not
113. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340-44 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
114. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 428 (1987) (concurring opinion of Justices
Scalia and Stevens).
115. Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of Trial Lawyers of America in Support of
Respondents, LEXIS, GENFED Library, BRIEFS File, Case No. 92-479.
116. Id. at *21.
117. Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of Trial Lawyers of America in Support of
Respondent Karl Oberg, LEXIS, GENFED Library, BRIEFS File, Case No. 93-644, sec-
tion II.C.
118. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2348.
119. E.g., Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages. The
Seventh Amendment and the Politics of Jury Power, 1991 COLUM. L. REV. 142 (1991).
[Vol. 48
PUNITIVE DAMAGE VERDICTS
inconsistent with judicial review for excessive damages. 120
The juxtaposition of "the idea that jurors can find the law" and "judicial
review" as "not inconsistent" is surprising. The heart of the argument for
jurors finding the law is the nullification theme that jurors should be free
from judicial review that would override the jury's refusal to follow the
substantive law.
The Court's tentative response to the jury nullification theme in the
due process context is a natural result of its persistence in Seventh
Amendment doctrine. The prominence of the nullification theme in the
ratification debates creates the appearance that the constitutional defini-
tion of the jury's role in federal court includes some freedom from judi-
cial control. It has survived for two centuries at the fringes of federal
practice, never part of the formal rules of civil procedure but never ex-
plicitly banished as an outlaw theory. Its shadowy existence has actually
increased both its longevity and its persistent appeal. It can be easily
praised because it does not have to be precisely defined; its flaws can be
ignored because rhetorical flourish does not require examination of how
it might work in practice. Its persistence alone is proof it cannot be extir-
pated, but it needs to be tamed because the due process attacks on puni-
tive damage verdicts is evidence the Court must find a way to combine
both a political role for the jury and judicial control of the jury's
decisions.
A. THE HISTORY THAT WILL NOT DIE
The historical record clearly shows that the Revolutionary experience
with jury nullification became an ingredient of the debates over ratifica-
tion of the Constitution.121 The colonists had learned first hand that a
colonial jury could defeat the enforcement of unpopular British laws.
The British response had also provided an immediate reminder that the
absence of a jury in admiralty and equity prevented jury nullification in
those courts. That knowledge about civil procedure was used in the ratifi-
cation debates by the Anti-Federalists, who objected to the fact that the
proposed Constitution did not guarantee civil jury trial. Their argument
played on fears about the effect of the new system, suggesting a guarantee
was needed so local debtors could count on civil juries to defeat the Brit-
ish creditors who would use the new federal courts to collect old debts.
They also suggested the guarantee would insure that federal officials
could be found liable by local juries if they oppressed local citizens. The
arguments did not defeat ratification, but they did precede adoption of
the Bill of Rights as promised by the Federalists.
The ratification debates give the Seventh Amendment an unusual legis-
lative history that is inherently contradictory and inconsistent if taken at
face value. There is a basic divergence of goals between the Anti-Feder-
120. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2342.
121. Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
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alist advocacy of occasional jury nullification and the Federalist effort to
establish equal justice and due process. It is important to remember,
however, that the nullification theme was an ingredient of political
speeches against the Constitution;122 and as such, contains political rheto-
ric, overstatement, and ambiguity. The speakers could not be too spe-
cific, because the same jury nullification that would defeat British
creditors could also defeat the claims of local creditors who could vote.
That was no obstacle to the rhetoric, because the purpose was not instruc-
tion on civil procedure but rather a political effort to convince voters to
vote against the new Constitution. The Federalists were content to argue
that Congress could be trusted to provide trial by jury and later to prom-
ise the Bill of Rights. No one challenged the nullification issue directly or
explained how to integrate the relatively short history of nullification
with the much longer development of due process and equal justice. His-
tory cannot show how to preserve both nullification and due process, be-
cause that combination has never been part of actual practice in a mature
and coherent system of civil procedure.
The ratification rhetoric has long served as evidence that jury nullifica-
tion was part of the original intent, but its value has been inflated due to
its one-sidedness. There was no opposition that forced the advocates of
jury nullification to explain how it would work in practice nor was there
any analysis of how jury nullification would be consistent with due pro-
cess. The Anti-Federalists did not have to justify the idea that certain
litigants would be treated unequally in the new courts. That bias would
completely contradict the effort to establish a new form of constitutional
government, but the Anti-Federalists were arguing for rejection of the
Constitution.12 3 The desire to reject the Constitution may excuse the
Anti-Federalists' unexplained rhetoric, but it does not justify the current
uncritical acceptance of the ratification debates as legitimate legislative
history.
The nullification described in the ratification debates was a caricature
of civil procedure, not the practice in ordinary litigation. Soon after
adoption of the Seventh Amendment the jury in Georgia v. Brailsford
was instructed that they had the right "to determine the law as well as the
fact in controversy.' 24 Was this an endorsement of the legitimacy of the
broad nullification position? Was it instead a reflection of the looser pro-
cedure of a simpler system that had served the colonies? Many colonial
judges had little legal education or experience, they presided in groups,
and they each instructed the jury on the law. Under those conditions the
jury might know as much law as the judge, and in any event a jury would
have to select which instructions to follow.' 25 That system served the col-
122. See Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme
Court's Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1320-28 (1978).
123. Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 941.
124. 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794).
125. THAYER, supra note 20, at 254-55; WILLFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY
OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 30 (1990).
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onists well enough, but that does not mean the same system would serve
in a more complex society.
The change in the jury's role as the country and legal system matured
has been described as judicial usurpation, 126 a label that assumes that the
early practice was a coherent system that could have been preserved. It
also assumes that jury nullification of creditor claims was more than rati-
fication rhetoric and that it became part of federal practice. In fact, the
early federal courts were apparently not constrained by the nullification
arguments. 12 7 The federal courts entered judgments on debts owed Brit-
ish creditors without an outbreak of nullification.128 That does not mean
the ratification history can be ignored; repeatedly, the image of jury
power brings it back. It does call, however, for attention to the logic of
jury nullification as a working principle for ordinary litigation.
B. THE EMPTY LOGIC OF CIVIL JURY NULLIFICATION
The idea of jury nullification has a surface appeal because it is advo-
cated at only a few obvious points. The core idea is that a jury should be
able to return a verdict contrary to the substantive law. That position is
usually advanced in opposition to a motion for a summary judgment or a
directed verdict; on occasion it might be raised in an effort to convince
the judge to instruct the jury that it has the power to ignore the instruc-
tions. The theme of jury power could be advanced after an otherwise
unexplainable verdict, as a ground for opposing a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. In the punitive damage debate
it has been implicit in arguments that the jury's power to assess punitive
damages should be uncontrolled. The obvious points all focus on the trial
itself, a fact that makes it appear jury nullification can be tacked on to the
rest of civil procedure. Any apparent logic of jury nullification falls apart
when civil procedure is viewed as a series of screening steps that apply
the substantive law to a set of facts.
A complaint asserts the plaintiff has a right to relief under the substan-
tive law, as applied to the factual situation described. If the defendant
challenges the sufficiency of the claim by a motion to dismiss, the judge
must decide if the complaint is sufficient. Most motions to dismiss raise
issues of procedure, about whether plaintiff described enough facts or
included all the elements of a recognized claim. Sometimes a motion to
dismiss raises a different kind of issue, because the plaintiff asserts that
the substantive law should include a claim not previously recognized.
The logic of true jury nullification would negate the judge's power to de-
cide such a substantive issue, because the dismissal of a complaint for
126. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 28-29, 140-
59 (1977); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 165-74 (1975).
127. Edith G. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 289 (1966); Kirst, supra note 19, at 19.
128. DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEW NATION 77-82, 89 (1971).
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failure to state a claim eliminates the chance that a jury might decide the
defendant should be liable for the offending conduct.
If the Seventh Amendment preserved jury nullification as described in
the ratification debates, it negated any judicial or legislative power to de-
fine the substantive law. Nullification would reduce the substantive law
to a single claim for a civil wrong, a claim with no elements. To illustrate
with an example from the ratification debates, an aggrieved citizen might
sue a federal official for an alleged injury, even though the conduct vio-
lated none of the recognized forms of action. The citizens on the jury
could not return a verdict reflecting local sentiment about the official's
conduct if the judge sustained a common law demurrer or modern motion
to dismiss. If the plaintiff could invoke the jury's power to prevent such a
judicial ruling, the substantive law would be whatever any jury might
decide.
Although no one ever seems to advocate abolishing all substantive law,
jury nullification is rarely defined. Instead, the praise or reliance on jury
nullification assumes only that the jury should have unrestrained power
over those cases that survive the initial judicial screening, with an implicit
concession that the Seventh Amendment permits judges to do some ini-
tial substantive screening. Since the Seventh Amendment does not affect
pleading decisions, judges control whether the jury will ever have a
chance to exercise their power. That result is directly contrary to the ar-
gument that the Seventh Amendment preserved the jury's power to act
free of judicial control.
The judicial screening also means that a defendant cannot always rely
on jury nullification. Using the other prime example from the ratification
debates, a defendant sued on a debt might want to defend on the ground
that the plaintiff was an unworthy person or a social outcast. The defense
that the creditor was a British merchant was supposed to be enough for a
jury to exercise its nullification power. How does a defendant who pleads
only that defense survive a motion to strike or a motion for judgment on
the pleadings? Of course, in practice a general denial might serve when
the trial strategy will be a plea for local prejudice, but that pleading style
simply masks the underlying issue. If the courts restrict the defenses that
can be raised under a general denial, adopt rules that restrict its use, or
sanction insufficient defenses, the case may never get as far as the jury.
Again, no one seems to argue that the Seventh Amendment freezes the
procedure or substantive law for defenses, so the judges control whether
the jury gets an opportunity to exercise its power.
Nullification appears similar in both civil and criminal cases if the pre-
trial stages are ignored. A criminal jury has uncontrolled power to ignore
the substantive law and acquit a defendant, because a criminal defendant
is the only party whose plea is unconstrained. An attempt to charge a
defendant with a nonexistent crime will be blocked by a judge's ruling on
a motion to dismiss, so one side of the jury's power is limited. On the
other side its power is basically not controlled. The defendant can plead
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not guilty for a good reason, a bad reason, or without any reason at all.
The defendant can refuse to testify, present no evidence, and still demand
a jury verdict. The judge can exclude irrelevant evidence and keep the
final argument within some bounds, but on the whole the criminal de-
fendant can come close to asking for the jury nullification described in
the ratification debates-civil litigants never can.
If the substantive law controls whether there is a need for a trial to
determine if certain facts support a claim, then it is illogical to assert that
the Seventh Amendment gave the jury a power of nullification that is
independent of judicial control. Summary judgment practice illustrates
how control of the substantive law can negate the jury's ability to nullify
by making a factual issue disappear. An example of this control is pro-
vided by Harlow v. Fitzgerald.129 The facts of Harlow provide a modern
example of a federal official's abuse of power, one of the very evils the
Anti-Federalists warned against. The opinion by Justice Powell is notable
for the way it explicitly changed the substantive law to achieve a different
result with the same procedure.
Prior to Harlow the Court had held that an official sued for violating
constitutional rights could assert the defense of qualified immunity, a de-
fense that included both a subjective component of intent and an objec-
tive component of the legality of the conduct. 130 In Harlow the Court
concluded that its previous opinions had not given officials enough pro-
tection. The subjective element of the official's intent created a difficult
fact issue. A defendant could assert the absence of evil intent in an affi-
davit in support of a motion for summary judgment, but a plaintiff could
still demand discovery in order to uncover evidence on the factual issue
of intent. A plaintiff could also avoid summary judgment with circum-
stantial evidence of intent. The Court therefore changed the substantive
law by eliminating intent as a part of the defense, leaving only the objec-
tive element.' 3 ' An official who could show that the alleged conduct was
not clearly unconstitutional at the time of the conduct would have a de-
fense that would allow summary judgment. The subjective element of
intent created a possible role for the jury when certain facts were in dis-
pute, but that role disappeared when the substantive law changed. Later
decisions requiring specific allegations of fact to support a claim of un-
constitutional intent further illustrate that an apparently procedural deci-
sion about pleading can restrict a jury's power to hear a case. 132
C. A POLITICAL ROLE-THE JURY ON Two LEVELS
The political role of the civil jury cannot be ignored even if nullification
is an illogical description. The ratification debates and the Seventh
Amendment confirm that civil jury trial had enough political importance
129. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
130. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
131. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19.
132. See Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 344-46 (7th Cir. 1991).
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to receive constitutional protection. A political role is inherent in the
concept of citizen participation. In each particular trial the judge and jury
share power to decide the case in a complex relation of power and re-
sponsibility. The jury's verdict is part of the government function of dis-
pute resolution. The verdict of each jury reflects how citizens understand
the substantive law and how they think it should be applied to particular
facts. The verdicts of juries can affect the political and economic power
of groups and individuals. The use of juries affects the power, prestige,
and legitimacy of the judicial branch.
Why does Seventh Amendment theory regularly slide into the nullifica-
tion quagmire as the only way to describe a political role for the jury?
The primary cause is the assumption that there are only two polar op-
tions. At one extreme is the view that each jury must play a political role
in each case, an overtly political description captured by the image of
each jury as a "little parliament. ' 133 At the other extreme is the view that
the jury should find the facts, apply a community standard, or decide
what is reasonable with no concern about the effect of litigation on pri-
mary conduct. The two options appear to create a stark choice, and
neither choice can be satisfactory if the jury is supposed to evaluate dis-
puted evidence and apply a community standard. The overtly political
role ignores the need for due process and consistency. The insistence that
the jury decide only sterile factual issues assumes that application of the
substantive law is not a political issue, an assumption that brings out the
ratification history in refutation.
A coherent description of the jury's political role must consider the
jury system at two levels. The individual jury and the institution of the
jury system are not the same thing. In each individual trial the emphasis
must be on due process and fair procedure for all litigants. In each indi-
vidual trial a jury should not have unlimited discretion to play a political
role because a verdict is an integral part of the government function of
dispute resolution. The significant political role must be recognized at
the institutional level that aggregates all jury verdicts. The verdicts of all
the juries reflect how citizens understand the substantive law and how
they think it should be applied to various facts. The verdicts of the jury
system affect the political and economic power of groups and individuals.
The use of the jury system affects the power, prestige, and legitimacy of
the courts. We must have individual jury verdicts to achieve the political
role of the jury system. We must have individual jury verdicts in order to
aggregate them, but that does not mean each jury has to carry the whole
burden. The verdicts of a large number of juries will both reflect and
establish a community standard, but that does mean that each jury verdict
alone does so correctly.
Voting is also a part of the political system, but we do not focus on the
individual and expect every voter to be an ideal elector. The value of
133. PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 164 (1956).
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voting depends on the election system as a whole. Of course, with juries
we never focus on the individual juror, but even the small group on each
jury is a narrow focus. The need to provide due process requires more
consistency from courts than we do from voters. Any political benefits of
jury trial accrue to all society, while the costs and burdens are more spe-
cific. The effect of a jury verdict is immediate for the parties, while the
entire unit feels the effect of an election. A verdict in a $100,000 dispute
affects the plaintiff and defendant directly, both of whom have a right to a
fair verdict and a rational procedure. An election may deny a $100,000
salary to a competent candidate, give it to an incompetent one, and do so
for irrational reasons. The loser has no way to challenge the voters' il-
logic. The eventual damage of poor government or wasted resources will
be shared by all. Eventually there will be another election to allow the
voters and candidates to repeat the exercise. The litigants get only the
one chance at trial.
The ratification history describes an incoherent model of civil jury trial
if the nullification rhetoric is accepted at face value. If read more
broadly, the model reflects another example of a system of checks and
balances. No single jury should be expected to do everything, because
the legislative and judicial definition of the substantive law controls
whether there will be a jury at all. It is the jury system as a whole that
balances the legislative and judicial development of the substantive law.
The image of each jury as a little parliament demands too much of each
jury. A better image is that the jury system as a whole is an ongoing
referendum, with each individual jury verdict providing one opinion
about the application of the substantive law to a particular set of facts.
The primary task of each jury is to decide one dispute according to the
substantive law. As a small group that is required to reach a unanimous
decision, the jury may evaluate the evidence with more care than a single
judge. If selected from a representative panel, the jury may evaluate the
evidence from a broader perspective than a judge. As a group of non-
professionals they may see the case as more unique than a judge would,
and may probe the issues in much greater depth. As a group of citizen
nonprofessionals they may also question the substantive law they hear in
the instructions. A general verdict can mask a host of possible scenarios
for the jury's deliberations, but that does not mean the jury is free to
ignore the substantive law. When it is clear that the jury did not follow
the substantive law or very likely did not do so, the verdict will be set
aside by judgment notwithstanding the verdict or the grant of a new trial.
Judicial power to control the jury verdict and to ignore a jury's opinion
about the effect of the law does not negate the civil jury as a balancing
force. Even if the jury has no power to insist on its view, the trial and
appellate judges have a duty to consider each verdict seriously. The
judges and legislatures have a duty to consider all the verdicts of the jury
system seriously. That is not the raw power of nullification doctrine, but
it is still a significant political role for the jury system. In that form the
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political power of the civil jury has been respected by judges for centu-
ries. It is the stuff of deciding motions for summary judgment, directed
verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and new trials. It is inher-
ent in deciding whether the evidence and substantive law frame a factual
dispute for the jury to decide. Most judges can do it most of the time, and
do it quite well, with a rough model of the jury's role for most issues.
However, the rough model can break down when the courts face a diffi-
cult issue if they assume there is no way to accommodate both a political
role for the jury and control of the jury's power.
IV. THE FUTURE FOR STATE AND FEDERAL JURY TRIAL
The Court can still avoid repeating the same kind of mistake it made in
Slocum. A majority of the Court has not yet held that modern trials
should conform to 19th century practice, nor has a majority held that the
role of the jury in assessing punitive damages is frozen by a static and
concrete reading of the historical record. The Court, however, has done
enough with the express statements of Justices Scalia and Kennedy and
the tacit concurrence of the other Justices to create doubt about the
proper method of interpreting the constitutional provisions that affect the
role of the jury. Two developments have shown how much more compli-
cated the punitive damage debate can become, how little progress the
Court has made, and how the punitive damage debate could undercut
settled Seventh Amendment doctrine.
A. SEVENTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
The Court cannot keep the due process requirements for state court
jury trials completely separate from Seventh Amendment doctrine. Sev-
enth and Fourteenth Amendment doctrine will intersect when a federal
court holds a jury trial on a punitive damage claim in a diversity action.
The roles of the federal judge and jury will be defined by the Seventh
Amendment, 134 while the claim for punitive damages will be defined by
state law.' 35 The task of applying state substantive law with federal pro-
cedure could become complicated. A state could respond to Haslip and
TXO by changing state procedure in a way that would restrict the role of
a state court jury in a way not permitted under the Seventh Amendment.
So far that has not been a serious problem, as several federal courts have
been able to accommodate both state substantive law and federal jury
trial doctrine with little difficulty. 136 However, the Fourth Circuit has
twice concluded that changes in state procedure created a conflict with
134. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
135. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
136. E.g., Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Servs., 5 F.3d 347 (8th Cir. 1993); Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d
1371, 1381 (3d Cir. 1993); Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993); Mason v.
Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991); Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d
1377 (5th Cir. 1991).
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the Seventh Amendment in a diversity case.137 The troubling portent of
the Fourth Circuit opinions is not its conclusion, but its method of consti-
tutional interpretation.
In Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp.138 the Fourth Circuit reversed a
punitive damage award because the jury instructions did not provide suf-
ficient guidance. The plaintiffs in this diversity case sued a trucking com-
pany for injuries they suffered when their car collided during a rainstorm
with a truck that had been parked on a highway while the driver made a
telephone call. At trial the district judge followed South Carolina law,
instructing the jury that it could award punitive damages for willful, wan-
ton, or reckless conduct, and that it could assess punitive damages in
"such sum as you believe will serve to punish" the defendant. 139 The jury
awarded punitive damages of $100,000 in addition to the compensatory
damages of $125,000.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the compensatory damage portion of the
judgment, but ordered a new trial of the punitive damage claim because
the jury instructions provided no meaningful standard. In an intervening
decision the South Carolina Supreme Court had also concluded that state
law did not satisfy the due process test of Haslip; it responded by requir-
ing a "more elaborate post-trial review" by state trial judges.140 There-
fore the Fourth Circuit opinion discussed whether the federal court on
remand would be able to use the new state law on punitive damages in
exactly the same manner as a state court would. The court concluded
that South Carolina procedure could not be adopted because the federal
judge's review of a punitive damage verdict would be "subject to the limi-
tations of the Seventh Amendment.' 4' The court reached that conclu-
sion after comparing the new South Carolina procedure with 1791
common law practice on the demurrer to the evidence and the motion for
a new trial, and finding that the state post-trial review did not match
either. 142
The Fourth Circuit's review of the constitutionality of a change in the
roles of judge and jury, by comparison to historical practice, brought back
exactly the method of constitutional interpretation the Supreme Court
abandoned in Galloway. The result is a prime example of the confusion
that can be caused by the introduction of historical comparison into the
punitive damage debate. After making a historical comparison, the
Fourth Circuit declared that state procedure could not be used because it
would allow a federal judge to evaluate a verdict on the basis of "evi-
dence that the jury was not permitted to consider at trial or on a legal
137. Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408 (4th Cir. 1992); Mattison v. Dallas
Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 107-09 (4th Cir. 1991).
138. 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991).
139. Id. at 100.
140. Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354 (S.C. 1991).
141. Mattison, 947 F.2d at 107.
142. Id. at 107-08.
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standard not given to the jury."'1 43 The court made clear that the power
of the federal trial judge was limited by its broad description of the jury's
role: "When a factual issue is committed to the jury, as punitive damages
are under federal law,.., the court cannot substitute its judgment for that
of the jury. Rather it can only grant a new trial, and then only under the
standards permitted by federal law."'144
The opinion only touched on important issues that were obscured by
the search for historical answers. Current federal procedure allows a fed-
eral judge to determine if a verdict is excessive by comparing it with other
cases which the jury did not hear. In doing so, the trial judge is necessar-
ily reviewing the judgment of the jury. On its face the language of the
Fourth Circuit declares that comparison is not permitted with a punitive
damage verdict. Current federal procedure allows the trial judge to em-
ploy the remittitur option instead of granting an unconditional new trial,
but the Fourth Circuit did not mention remittitur and used language that
would permit only a new trial. That may have been simply an oversight
or the remittitur option may have been implicit in its discussion, but the
structure of the opinion suggests it was neither. The court discussed the
standard for a new trial at some length and even quoted from Justice
Story's opinion in Blunt,145 with no mention at all of the remittitur proce-
dure he introduced. That left trial judges to wonder about the extent of
their power to review a punitive damage verdict.
One year later, in Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway,146 an en banc Fourth
Circuit reaffirmed the holding in Mattison, with the same judge writing
the majority opinion. The court was reviewing a judgment from a diver-
sity case in which plaintiff had sued a Virginia roller skating rink for ra-
cially motivated harassment and intimidation. The jury was instructed
under Virginia law that it could award punitive damages in "such amount
as you shall unanimously agree to be proper."'1 47 The jury's verdict held
the rink liable for compensatory damages of $25,000 and punitive dam-
ages of $175,000. On appeal the Fourth Circuit held that the instructions
gave the jury no standard for assessing punitive damages, and reversed
for a new trial of the punitive damage claim.148 The court again held that
the federal judge could not follow state procedure in the retrial; it held
that all the factors considered by state trial judges in reviewing a verdict
had to be applied by the federal jury as the fact finder.' 49 The en banc
Fourth Circuit was divided on this issue by an eight to five vote, but the
objection in the dissenting opinions was that the earlier opinion in Matti-
son had misinterpreted Haslip.150 None of the dissenting judges men-
143. Id. at 108.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 974 F.2d 1408 (4th Cir. 1992).
147. Id. at 1415.
148. Id. at 1419.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1442.
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tioned the historical comparison that was used as the method of
constitutional interpretation in Mattison.
Mattison and Johnson may mark the first step in what could eventually
become a growing divergence between the roles of state and federal ju-
ries in assessing punitive damages. By itself this divergence would be
neither unique nor necessarily bad. State and federal jury trial shares a
common history, but the Court has left the states free to pursue a differ-
ent course even if it might require an awkward accommodation in a di-
versity case. However, that does not mean such divergence is actually
required by the Seventh Amendment. The Fourth Circuit's reintroduc-
tion of historical comparison to Seventh Amendment interpretation arti-
ficially narrowed the range of options. Once the comparison found no
1791 analogue for state law practice, the court assumed that it faced an
all-or-nothing choice. On that assumption the trial judge had to be lim-
ited to evidence and factors the jury considered. That could give the jury
too much information and a task that is too complex; avoiding that prob-
lem would give the judge too little comparative information and a role
that is too limited. Other circuits have declined to follow Mattison,151 but
that fact is not very reassuring when one-third of the Supreme Court is
strongly arguing for similar reliance on historical detail.
B. THE JURY'S POLITICAL ROLE IN ASSESSING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A very clear example of how historical comparison can further compli-
cate the punitive damage debate came in a state court opinion dated the
same day as TXO. The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court in Hen-
derson v. Alabama Power Co.1 52 highlights the conflict between the as-
sumption in Haslip that historical practice will suffice to define the jury's
role and its optimistic hope that statutory caps will eliminate the problem
of excessive verdicts. The Alabama court held that statutory caps violate
the state constitution, because they are a modern response that has no
historical roots. The facts of the case were straightforward; a jury verdict
for $500,000 in punitive damages and a statutory cap of $250,000. The
majority's analysis was straightforward as well; the state legislature could
abrogate the cause of action but could not establish any limits on the
jury's power to assess damages. After reviewing the historical record to
establish that juries had been allowed to assess punitive damages when
the state constitution was adopted, the majority explained why the jury's
assessment of punitive damages could not be limited by the legislature:
"In performing this function, the jury is an institution of the body politic.
In a jury, citizens exercise direct democracy, whereas the legislature con-
sists of representatives of the people, exercising the people's power and
151. Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1381 (3d Cir. 1993); Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 14 F.3d 373, 379 n.8 (8th Cir. 1993); Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244,
1264 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993) (Nelson, J., dissenting); Benny M. Estes & Assocs. v. Time Ins. Co.,
980 F.2d 1228, 1235 (8th Cir. 1992).
152. 627 So.2d 878 (Ala. 1993).
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doing their will only indirectly. The jury serves as the conscience of the
community. '"153
In combination the reasoning of the Alabama court and the historical
comparison of the Fourth Circuit could lead to the conclusion that a fed-
eral jury must be allowed to assess punitive damages in any amount, even
if state law establishes a limit on them. So far even the Fourth Circuit has
not gone that far; it had earlier rejected a similar Seventh Amendment
challenge and held that a state statutory lid on compensatory damages
would be followed in a federal jury trial.' 54 That illustrates the slipperi-
ness of its later reliance on historical detail. In Mattison the jury awarded
$100,000 in punitive damages because of a motor vehicle collision. There
is no evidence from 1791 that a statute limited punitive damages to a
lesser amount, that any jury had awarded $100,000 for punitive damages,
or that anyone sought punitive damages for a motor vehicle collision.
Historical fidelity can equally prove that there can be no statutory limit,
that no jury can assess punitive damages that large, or that no one can
claim punitive damages because of a traffic collision. Seventh Amend-
ment doctrine has rejected all three conclusions because the jury does not
have a role unless there is a factual dispute, on the issues framed by the
substantive law.
The federal courts have not gone as far as the Alabama court, but the
opinion is still a very good reminder that historical comparison can bring
forth variations on the jury nullification theme. It is also a reminder that
there has been too little examination of that theme. In each new debate
about the jury's role the jury nullification theme creates the appearance
that either the jury must have complete discretion or the jury's role must
be completely subordinate to judicial and legislative control. The puni-
tive damage debate will not reach a stable resolution if those stark
choices provide the only options. Seventh Amendment doctrine suggests
the alternative of considering the jury's role on both levels. That perspec-
tive makes it possible to accommodate both legislative control of each
punitive damage verdict and a political role for the verdicts returned by
the whole jury system. Then the rules of procedure do not have to allow
each individual jury to play a complete political role. Judges and legisla-
tures can define when punitive damages are possible and any limits on
the amount of punitive damages, while each jury verdict provides one
more piece of information from the jury system on the wisdom of the
substantive rules.
The viability of civil jury trial always requires a balance between pow-
erful forces. In the due process cases one side has hoped to abolish puni-
tive damage verdicts entirely while the other has dreamed of eliminating
judicial control of the jury's power. It is just as well the Court has moved
slowly and avoided either of these stark choices. In future cases the
Court should use its own Seventh Amendment doctrine as a model of a
153. Id. at 893.
154. Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1195-96 (4th Cir. 1989).
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mature procedural system that preserves a role for the jury while provid-
ing judicial control to ensure due process to all parties. The states do not
have to be limited to that model, but it does provide a coherent interpre-
tation of the common history of jury trial shared by state and federal
courts. As a model that has been well tested over two centuries of debate
about civil jury trial, it will provide a firm foundation for deciding
whether any particular state has deviated so far from the common con-
sensus about the role of the jury that its courts no longer provide due
process. By consulting its Seventh Amendment doctrine the Court can
make clear there is no conflict between due process and the right to jury
trial, and reaffirm that constitutional interpretation can preserve the sub-
stance of civil jury trial without hobbling modern procedure by the need
to match historical detail.

